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1. Introduction
2- Macro Situation and Policy ~ Dennis Starleaf
A. Inflation, growth, redistribution as a result of rapid growth of
money supply at home and abroad to '79.
B. Tight money, recession, strong dollar, decline in raw material
prices, trade deficit in goods since 1979.
C. Prospects for future U.S. and World recovery, further gains in
productivity, balance of payments, balanced budget in 1983 and on.
3. Trade Situation and Policy - Bob Wisner
A. Unstable, managed, interdependent, slowing.
B. Exchange rate and recession vs embargo as explanation of
stagnation.
C» Prospects for aggressive export promotion and subsidy, blended
credit•
4* Domestic Demand - Gene Futrell, Bob Wisner
A. Recession, unemployment, falling real Income for some.
B. Shifting tastes, dietary, more chicken, less fat, food away from
home, vegetables.
C. Policy impact and prospects, reduced school lunch, food stamps, less
unemployment pay, etc.
5. Agri Policy - Charles Gratto
A. Fine tune the present
1. cost saving - put limit on FOR, e.g., 10% of disappearance.
Limit land diversion to 102 of capacity, lower loan rate, use
more cash land diversion relative to FOR and PIK
ii. raise efficiency - use more bids, for diversion and PIK, vary
program yields more among land classes, target diversion within
farm to the more erosive land, announce program in September —
prevent production. Don't store surplus over estimated need.
B. More government supply control
Limit production to demand at cost of production. More CCC owned
stocks, reinstate call level on FOR; tax tons of top soil eroded to
produce surplus, similarly tax ground water depletion to product
surplus, tax N & P fertilizer used to produce surplus. Use
referendum and impose quotas if majority accept. Require cross
compliance in supply control if farmer in FmHA, ACP, FOR, Crop
Insurance, Federal marketing orders, etc.
C. Less government intervention so more demand oriented.
Let market clear, re-emphasize deficiency payment or institute
negative income tax, reduce target price, put $50,000 payment limit
per family, lower the loan rate to just over variable costs
(approximately $1.60 per bushel on corn).
6. Impacts of above three alternatives on:
A. Consumers and taxpayers - Paulsen and Harl
B. Agri business and transportion complex - Baumel
C. Finance and Structural impact, wealth, rural towns and credit -
Boehlje
D. Impact of Farm Structure on Rural Areas - Heady
E. Resource conservation - Miranowski and Heady
7. Summary
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The Next Generation of U.S. Farm Polide®
to be presented by Lee Kolmer
I. Introduction
Clearly U.S. agriculture has excess capacity. U.S. consumption plus
foreign sales were 5-10% less than production in 1981 and 82. Except for
massive and expensive supply control, 1983 production would similarly exceed
the weak current demand. Stocks of corn and rice at the end of the current
marketing year will be about 50% of this year's utilization. For wheat and
cotton the carryover into next year will be about 70% of this years'
disappearance.
United States large agricultural capacity is a valuable national asset.
Besides fully supplying the U.S. population, U.S. agriculture earns more
than twice enough foreign exchange to pay for all the coffee, sugar,
bananas and other agricultural imports to the U.S. Total U.S. merchandize
trade deficit in 1983 may be about 40 billion.
However, both farmers and taxpayers find it costly to carry the large
U.S. agricultural capacity through periods, like now, when it cannot be
fully employed. In 1981 U.S. agriculture was allowed to fully produce and
the weather provided two good crops. Between weak demand and little 1982
supply control, grain prices fell below total cost of production but were
kept above variable costs by price supports. By fall of 1982 it was clear
that within a year stocks would accumulate beyond expected future need.
Excessive 1982 production was kept off the market largely because of the
attractiveness of the the farmer-owned reserve. To control 1983 production
significantly below demand and reduce excess stocks, PIK was offeredin
conjunction with a paid land diversion program. This combination was the
most expensive farm program in our history.
Many agri-busineas groups in Iowa have been hurt by weak demand, excess
t, capacity, low farm prices and supply control. Most lowans would prefer
restoration of full employment for agriculture at prices that would cover
costs of production. This solution is dependent upon absorption of
substantial supplies of agricultural commodities in world trade which in
turn is heavily influenced by U.S. and foreign macro economic policy.
In 1982 many full time grain farmers, especially those trying to expand
rapidly, found themselves dangerously short of cash; some were even unable
to meet fixed debt obligations. In 1983 many livestock feeders, grain
elevators and farm supply businesses are finding that gross margins will not
cover expenses and debt service. They will have a cash flow shortage as a
direct result of storage and supply control policies.
Information available at this time indicates that the total cost to the
taxpayer of 1982 excess production and 1983 supply control may total $30
billion. If so, we may be in the middle of a very expensive U.S.
agricultural farm program. However, direct costs of maintaining federal
agricultural programs should be considered in juxta position with food and
fiber costs to consumers. Although the political consequences may not be
comparable, high food prices and low program costs may exact the same
overall cost as low food prices and high program costs. The burdens,
however, may differ significantly. However, there may be significance
differences in efficiency between the two polar extremes.
These constitute highly important policy questions for the Congress.
II, The Macroeconomic Enviroment and Macroeconomic Policies:
Their Effect upon Agricultural Prices and Incomes
Dennis Starleaf
Overview
From the end of World War II through the 1960s, the U.S. agricultural
sector operated in a macroeconomic environment which, by today's standards,
was uncomplicated and highly stable:
• agricultural production was predominantly directed toward the
domestic market, in that exports through commercial channels were
smal1.
• The macroeconomic policies — monetary and fiscal — of the Federal
government exhibited a great deal of consistency over time.
• "Hie rate of inflation was low (except in the late 1940s and, to a
much lesser extent, during the late 1960s).
• Business cycle contractions were generally mild and of short
duration.
• Federal agricultural price-support programs further contributed to
reducing year-to-year variability in the prices of most U.S.
agricultural products.
Since the early 1970's U.S. agriculture has operated in a much
different macroeconomic environment:
• Exports have become a significant portion of the total demand for
U.S. agricultural products and export demands have proved to be
variable•
• Monetary policy has become erratic. At times, the money supply
growth rate has been increased dramatically in order to stimulate
aggregate demand and to reduce the unemployn^nt rate. At other
f times, it has been reduced sharply to lower the inflation rate,
• The rate of inflation has generally been high by the standard of
U.S. historical experience and it has also exhibited a great deal
of variability.
• Two rather long and quite severe business cycle contractions
(1974-75 and 1981-82) were experienced. Furthermore, there was
virtually no expansion in the aggregate real output of the U.S.
economy frcaa mid-1979 through the end of 1982.
• Federal agricultural price-support programs were generally relaxed
so that agricultural prices became more subject to the effects of
short-run shifts in demand and supply.
Review of the Macroeconomic Environment From 1970 to 1978
Between 1969 and 1972, the December-to-December growth rate of the U.S.
ML money supply was Increased from 3.2 to 9.2 percent per year. This was an
extraordinary inflationary action on the part of the Federal Reserve
authorities. As a result. Inflationary pressures became so great in the
United States in 1973 that the Federal government had to abandon its system
of wage and price controls (which had been put in place in mid-1971), there
was a general "flight from the U.S. dollar" abroad, the Bretton-Woods syst^
of fixed exchange rates collapsed, and the dollar dropped in value in terms
of European currencies by about 20 percent.
These events plus generally poor crop production throughout the world
(except in the United States) caused U.S. agricultural exports to rise
sharply and U.S. net farm Income (deflated by the Consumer Price Index) to
more than double between 1970-71 and 1973. They also caused the Inflation
rate in the United States to rise into the "double digit" range.
The Federal Reserve authorities then adopted a tight money policy.
Between 1972 and 1974, the December-to-December Ml money supply growth rate
declined from 9.2 percent to 4,4 percent per year* This rapid shift io
monetary policy from highly inflationary to disinflationary appears to be
the principal cause of the longest and most severe business cycle contrac
tion experienced by the U.S. economy in the post-World War II period up to
that time (that of 1974-75). It also had its desired affect of reducing the
rate of inflation — by 1976, the rate of inflation (by all measures) was
less than 5.0 percent per year. It also caused the foreign-exchange value
of the U.S. dollar to stabili:rfe.
Partly because of the depressed domestic market for U.S. agricultural
products and partly because of improved crops abroad, between 1973 and 1976,
net farm income (deflated by the Consumer Price Index) fell by about 60
• percent.
y. Following the recession of 1974-75, the U.S. economy expanded strongly.
During each of the years from 1975 through 1978, real (i.e., inflation
adjusted) GNP rose by more than 5 percent and employment rc^e by about 4
percent. This rapid expansion was partly due to a generally permissive
fiscal policy (although the Federal budget was nearly balanced by early
1979), but it was mainly due to an easy monetary policy. Between 1975 and
1978, the Ml ncney supply growth rate increased from 4.9 percent to 8.3
percent per year. During this same tisje period, real (i.e., adjusted for
inflation) net farm income rose modestly.
The 1975-78 expansion in the U.S. economy was so vigorous that by 1978
the inflation rate was once again pushing into the "double digit range and
the U.S. dollar was rapidly falling in value in terms of European
currencies•
A Review of the Macroeconomic Environment Since 1978
By early 1979, it was obvious that something had to be done to curtail
the growth rate of dollar spending for the output of the U.S. econcmy, less
the inflation rate be pushed even higher. Consequently, the Federal Reserve
authorities adopted a tight laoney policy. Under this policy the growth rate
of the Ml money supply was reduced from an annual rate of 8.2 percent in
1978 to 3.8 percent in the first half of 1982.
The purpose of the tight money policy was to reduce the rate of
Inflation, But the way a tight money policy works should be obvious to all
by now. It drives up interest rates, curtails private borrowing and,
thereby, curtails spending for the output of the economy.
But the reduced rate of growth of dollar spending for the output of the
economy does not immediately cause a reduction in the rate of inflation.
This is because, once established, inflation takes on something of a life of
its own — it gets built into human behavior concerning wage and price
increases.
Consequently, \Aien the growth rate of dollar spending drops off,
inflation temporarily continues at its previous rate or even increases,
while real (i.e*> adjusted for inflation) spending for the output of the
^ ecoQon^ is curtailed and the econo&y generates excess productive capacity*
^ With the rise in excess capacity and the unemployment rate, the rate of wage
and price increases slowly drops off*
' This is precisely \^at occurred during the 1979-82 period. The tight
money policy reduced the rate of growth of dollar spending for the output of
the economy, but the inflation rate responded sluggishly to this develop
ment. Consequently, the real output of the economy exhibited no real
expansion between jnid-1979 and late-1982 and we experienced a short
recession in 1980 and a long recession in 1981-82.
The agricultural sector was also clearly affected. On the one hand,
the lack of expansion in the U.S. economy slowed the growth of consumer
incomes and thus slowed the growth of domestic demaiul for agricultural
products. On the other hand, the tight money policy, by pushing up don«stic
interest rates, attracted a flood of foreign financial capital, iirfiich in
turn raised the value of the U.S. dollar (in terms of European currencies)
by about 20 percent between 1979 and 1981. As a result, the foreign demand
for U.S. agricultural products dropped sharply and net farm income (deflated
by the Consumer Price Index) fell from $14.9 billion in 1979 to $9.2 billion
in 1981.
All of this was compounded by the tax cut of 1981. Tax rates were oit
very substantially in 1981 while overall there was no cut in the rate of
growth of Federal expenditures. (Indeed, the rate of growth of Federal
expenditures in real terms [i»e., adjusted for inflation] was larger under
the budget proposals of the Reagan administration than was the case during
-?•
Che late-1970s). Tliis has produced mind-boggling Federal fiscal deficits in
the neighborhood of $200+ billion per year for the foreseeable future. The
1981 tax cuts vrere expected to induce capital spending but the tight money
policy being pursued, and weak demand combined to reduce total private
capital spending.
The combination of an extremely easy (inflationary) fiscal policy plus
a tight monetary policy produced very high real Interest rates (i.e., the
nominal or actual interest rates viiiich people pay or receive less the rate
of inflation), (see Fig. lA) This in turn caused the exchange-value of the
U.S. dollar to rise further, (see Fig, IC) By late-1982 or early-1983, the
value of the U.S. dollar in terms of European currencies was up about 40
percent from what it had been in 1979. This has greatly depressed the
demand for U.S. agricultural exports and, undoubtedly, is the major
explanation for the decline in real (i.e., deflated by the Consumer Price
Index) net farm income to $6.7 billion in 1982 and the weakening of U.S.
trade balance (see Fig. ID).
The Macroeconomic Outlook for the Future
The macroeconomic outlook for the U.S. economy is "bullish" for the
near future. Since mid—1982, the U.S. Ml money supply has been growing at
an annual rate of about 14 percent. This highly stimulative (inflationary)
monetary policy, combined with a highly stimulative (inflationary) fiscal
policy, will cause the U.S. economy to expand very vigorously at least
through inid-1984.
The near term outlook for U.S. agriculture is not nearly so "bullish."
Extremely high Federal budget deficits are likely to keep real interest
rates high in the United States, attract foreign financial investment into
the United States, and thus keep the exchange value of the dollar high.
This will make any significant improvement in the export demand for U.S.
agricultural products unlikely within the next year or so, baring a major
foreign agricultural disaster.
The outlook for the U.S. economy beyond the next 12 months is dependent
upon both monetary and fiscal policies. Unless the rate of Ml money supply
growth is cutback greatly within the next year, another dose of "double
digit" inflation seems inevitable. And unless the President and the
Congress significantly reduce the projected growth rate of the Federal
budget deficit, the U.S. economy is unlikely to grow in the future as It has
in the past. The President and the Congress need to understand that private
capital accumulation which is the engine of growth is only possible when the
national net saving rate is positive. Federal budget deficits are a
negative component arui subtract frcm other national net saving. (Projected
Federal deficits for the next several years are nearly equal to the
projected saving of the U.S. private economy.)
The outlook for the U.S. agriculture sector is also troublesome for the
future beyond the next year or so. A revival of "double digit" inflation
would give temporary relief to the current problems of farmers, but this
would likely be followed by another period of disinflationary policy with a
repeat of the 1981-83 weak demand and excess capacity impact upon
agriculture. If Federal budget deficits continue on their current projected
path, U.S. agriculture exports will not grow in the future — they will
decline.
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For the long-run health of the total U.S. economy, as well as that of
the U.S. farm economy, two raacroeconomic policy measures are necessary:
First, monetary policy must become more consistent over time. This
means that the Federal Reserve authorities must abandon their practice of
the last 12 years or so of periodically expanding the rate of money supply
growth and then contracting it. We need to get off the roller coaster of
inflationary and then disinflationary monetary policy actions in favor of a
more nearly constant growth rate of the money supply.
Second, the President and the Congress need to abandon their
recently-acquired infatuation with deficit spending. For the U.S. farm
economy in particular, a return to the attitude of the 1970s toward deficit
spending (i.e., large Federal budget deficits were to be tolerated only when
the economy was in recession) would be a very important positive event.
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III. Reduced Foreign Demand for U.S. Farm Products is the Major
Explanation for of Excess Capacity in U.S. Agriculture
Bob Wisner
The value of U.S. farm product exported is declining this season for
the second consecutive year. This news brought shock waves across the U.S.
agricultural sector in 1982 and early 1983. While export earnings remain
huge in comparison with a decade ago, weaker foreign demand has cut U.S. net
farm income, sales of farm supply industries, volume of grain transportation
and handling and employment of workers in rural areas and industries related
to agriculture. Recent projections indicate U.S. agricultural exports in
the 1982-83 fiscal year (October-September) will total $35 Billion. That
represents a 10 percent decline from the previous fiscal year and a 20
percent drop from the peak level in 1980-81.
Rising world stocks placed sharp downward pressure on world feed grain
and oilseed prices in late 1982. But by spring 1983, world feed grain
prices had recovered to the highest level since early 1981. Higher prices
were due to heavy farmer participation in the U.S. Payment-In-Kind and U.S.
Grain Reserve Programs. The Payment-In-Kind Program may reduce 1983 world
grain production modestly, but with normal growing conditions aggregate
world supplies are expected to be fully adequate to meet market demand.
Financial Developments Restraining U.S. and World Trade
Key factors behind the recent world wide weakness in prices of farm
product exports (see Fig. 2) include (1) recent strength of the U.S. dollar
and (2) debt burdens of several important grain importing and exporting
nations. These developments are related to U.S. and foreign monetary and
fiscal policies.
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In the early 1970*8, as the dollar fell in value, foreign buyers of
farm products could obtain more U.S. dollars for their currency than
previously. That dramatically lowered the cost of U.S. agricultural
products in many foreign markets, and contributed to the upward explosion of
American farm exports from 1972 to 1980. By the end of 1979. however, the
U.S. Federal Reserve System began restraining money supply growth xn an
effort to curb inflationary pressures. This restraint along with the
resulting high U.S. interest rates (Figure lA), tax policies aimed at
encouraging U.S. domestic investment and other factors brought a flow of
funds into the U.S. for investment purposes (Figure IB). The in-flow of
funds has substantially strengthened the U.S. dollar against most foreign
currencies in the last two and one-half years (Figure IC). A stronger
dollar increases foreign buyers' costs of purchasing U.S. (Figure 2)
products, thus retarding export demand (Figure ID).
With the stronger dollar, prices to foreign buyers have declined much
less in the past two and one-half years than in U.S. cash markets. And in
many foreign markets, prices to foreign users have actually increased
substantially while U.S. prices were declining.
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Policy Issues in World Food Trade
Global food and agricultural policies will impact heavily on American
farmers the rest of this decade. In fact* trade-related policies appear to
be more important to U.S. agriculture now than in the past two decades.
Important trade issues include monetary and fiscal policy and exchange
ratesj embargoes, export subsidies, import restrictions, supply management,
agricultural development, bilateral trade agreements, global food security
and alternatives for financing imports of developing nations. The current
weakness in U.S. and world food exports is strongly related to monetary and
fiscal conditions. Attention to this area is likely to be most effective in
improving the longer term performance of American farm product exports.
Monetary and Fiscal Policies
U.S. agricultural exports are being restrained by debt burdens of
several developing and middle Income nations. Numerous factors
contributed to the build-up of excessive debts Including (l) unrealistic
expectations about future demand growth and inflation rates in developed
nations, (2) substantial growth of the U.S. money supply in the 1970*8 and a
plentiful supply of funds available for loans to developing nations, and (3)
recent change in U.S. and foreign monetary and fiscal policies that have
generated high interest rates, a slowdown of economic growth in industrial
nations and a strong U.S. dollar. With widespread use of variable-interest
loans, high real Interest rates have made developing nations' debts more
burdensome than originally anticipated. In addition, developed nations are
the major market outlet for products of the developing world, A slowdown in
economic growth of major industrial nations haa contributed to the debt
16
burdens of potential foreign customers for U.S. farm products by slowing the
growth in demand for their economic output-
To safely resolve current debt problems, moderation and patience will
be required. It appears likely that the next few years will be a period of
global adjustment and consolidation of debts with world food trade growing
more slowly than in the 1970's. World economic growth also appears likely
to be less robust than in the last decade* but would accelerate in the late
1980's as debt pressures diminish. Future growth rates will depend heavily
on policy actions taken in the next two years.
Embargoes
U.S. has not been the only nation to halt exports of farm products in
recent years. Exporters such as Brazil) Argentina, Canada, Australia and
Thailand often halt sales of agricultural commodities because of limited
supplies. Exportable supplies from these nations individually are much
smaller than those of the U.S. and such embargoes generally have little
market impact. However, the U.S. is by far the largest exporter of wheat,
coarse grains and soybeans, and a U.S. embargo has much larger effects on
world trade patterns. Embargoes distort market signals to U.S. and foreign
producers. In some cases, U.S. trade restrictions may encourage increased
domestic production by importing nations. Without strong cooperation from
other exporting countries, embargoes have been ineffective in restricting
total imports of an individual country. For these reasons, trade embargoes
are undesirable from an economic viewpoint.
Recent legislation provides U.S. agriculture with substantial
protection against trade embargoes except in cases of national emergencies.
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This legislation is likely to reduce but not completely eliminate the
possibility of U.S. export embargoes in the years ahead.
Trade Subsidies
Trade subsidies are used by some nations as a means of reducing
domestic surpluses or increasing their share of global trade* With
declining world grain exports in 1982-83, surplus supplies in the European
Economic Community (EC) and U.S. have generated increased pressure for use
of trade subsidies. Trade subsidies can accomplish their objectives only if
(1) they are targeted to countries otherwise lacking purchasing power or (2)
they cause competing countries to reduce production or increase carryover
stocks. Trade subsidies may create a trade war with increasing costs to
taxpayers as each country matches the other's increasingly larger subsidies
in an attempt to obtain a larger share of the market. In the current
U.S.-EC subsidy situation, the U.S. has obtained substantial 1982-83 flour
sales to Egypt at EC's expense, but lost wheat sales to EC in China.
Trade subsidy impacts on production of developing nations also should
be considered. Heavily subsidized exports to developing countries can
decrease incentives to expand production in recipient nations. In the
longer-run, large scale use of such subsidies could thus have disadvantages
for some developing countries. With these potential negative aspects» it
seems advisable to use trade subsidies with substantial caution. They
should not be expected to solve current weakness in export demand that stem
from world economic problems.
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Bilateral Trade Agreements
In 1976, the U.S. entered into its first five-year grain trade agree
ment with the Soviet Union. With Russia often being one of the world's
largest importers of grain and with large year-to-year variations in import
needs, potential disruptions in grain market were ever-present. To reduce
uncertainty about Soviet purchases, the U.S.-USSR grain agreement provided
for specific minimum and maximum quantities to be sold annually by the U.S.
to USSR. U.S. also has negoclated similar agreements with Mexico and the
People's Republic of China.
Bilateral agreements are Intended to provide importing nations with an
assured quantity of grain regardless of world market conditions. In that
sense, they tend to by-pass the normal market functions of discouraging
utilization when world supplies are limited and encouraging utilization when
supplies are large. As an increasing share of global grain trade is brought
under such agreements, one can expect more severe adjustment burdens in
countries which rely on relatively free market conditions to balance chang
ing supplies with demand. A similar Impact stems from the EC variable levy
and high Internal price support system for wheat and coarse grains. The
system to a large extent Insulates EC grain users from variations In world
supplies. These and other policies which reduce needed utilization adjust
ments by large grain users tend to magnify the adjustment burden faced by
U.S. and certain developing nations. From a policy standpoint, It is
questionable whether widespread global use of trade agreements is desirable
for American agriculture. However, a case might be made that such
agreements are appropriate with the Soviet Union because of Its centralized
19
government purchasing agency and a resulting potential for large unexpected
fluctuations in its imports.
Food Security
Despite burdensome grain carryover stocks in the U.S., food security
remains an important and complex policy issue for much of the developing
world. The geographic distribution of inventories is important for the food
security of developing nations, and also affects prices paid to producers in
the U.S. and other exporting nations.
Unresolved issues in world food security include (1) the desired size
of reserve stocks both globally and in individual countries, (2) methods of
sharing storage costs, (3) procedures for timing the acquisition and release
of reserve stocks, and (4) impacts of reserve stocks on producers in both
importing and exporting nations. With the differing viewpoints of
producers, consumers, exporters, and importers of food, the prospects for a
large-scale unified world food reserve system remain clouded.
Trade Protectionism
The sluggish world economy, high unemployment levels and declining
world trade have generated increasing global pressures for protection
against import competition. In the U.S., examples of protectionist pressure
include recent restrictions on textile imports and discussions of further
restrictions on imports of foreign autos and steel. In responding to these
pressures, policy makers should note the experience with protectionism in
the early 1930's. Similar world economic conditions led to passage of the
Hawley-Smoot Tariff in the U.S. in 1930. This act provided high tariffs on
20
U.S. imports and was one of several factors contributing to a substantial
decline in global trade and economic activity. Import restrictions tend to
discourage trade by restricting the ability of nations to earn foreign
exchange for buying other country's products.
Other Policy Areas
Other policy areas of current concern include procedures for balancing
global grain production and utilization, strategies for encouraging agricul
tural development in developing nations and methods of financing imports in
the developing world. It appears that most of the production adjustment to
match declining world trade will be done by the U.S. From a U.S. viewpoint,
it would be desirable to have the adjustment burden shared by other export
ing nations. But so far, no mechanism has been developed to do so. The
future of food production and trade in the developing world will depend
heavily on its access to financing, not only for imports but also for
economic development. Developed nations and world monetary authorities face
a major challenge in the years immediately ahead in finding creative ways to
finance these needs.
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IV. Domestic Demand for Farm Products Little Affected by Macro Policy
Bob Wisner and Gene Futrell
Domestic demand for products of the grain-livestock industry is rather
stable, growing slowly with population, shifting to some extent by changing
consumer tastes and preferences, dietary admonitions and relative prices of
meat products, but fluctuating little with the strength of the nation s
economy. Recent USDA research along with observations from the 1970's and
early 1980's suggest that domestic demand for meat is slightly but not
strongly influenced by the level of U.S. economic output. The quantity of
meat consumption during the current recession was nearly stable perhaps
through growth of built-in U.S. income transfers such as food stamps,
unemployment compensation, social security, and various feeding programs.
The index of prices received by farmers for meat animals was also rather
stable from 1980 through 1982.
U.S. per capita consumption of all meat has been remarkably stable
throughout the business cycles of the past 12 years. In 1971, per capita
consumption of red meat and poultry was 205.6 pounds per person (retail
weight red meat and ready to cook poultry). In 1983, it will be about 204.6
pounds. The record level of per capita consumption was in 1981 at 207.6
pounds per capita.
The consumption patterns of the last decade indicate specific meat
purchases are sensitive to relative prices of various meat and poultry
products. The mix of red meat vs. poultry varies with cyclical levels of
livestock production, but the poultry share has trended upward since 1971.
During that time period (1971-1983), per capita beef consumption declined
6.6 pounds along with an 8.2 pound decline in pork consumption. These
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decliaes were offset by a 13.7 pound increase in per capita poultry
consumption. The shift from pork and beef to poultry tended to slightly
reduce domestic grain feeding from levels Chat would otherwise have existed,
with the likely impact being about 150 to 200 million bushels com
equivalent or slightly less than 4 percent of total 1982-83 U.S. feed grain
feeding. More poultry, on the other hand, slightly increased the demand for
soybeans and soybean meal over levels that would otherwise have existed.
Several factors probably contributed to this trend away from red meat to
poultry including relative prices, conversion of pasture to cropland, the
economic recession, changing dietary attitudes, and innovations in poultry
retailing and the fast-food industry.
A strong U.S. economy and reduced unemployment would tend to increase
U.S. demand for meat products some in the years ahead, thus encouraging a
small increase in domestic grain feeding. But with U.S. per capita c^at
consumption at near-record levels of over 200 pounds per person, domestic
meat demand appears likely to be much less responsive to general economic
conditions than export markets.
While level and mix of meat consumption are major determinants of
domestic grain feeding, several other factors also are important. During
the 1970's the intensity of grain feeding per meat animal seemed very
sensitive to meat-feed price ratios. In the last 12 years, domestic corn
feeding has fluctuated from a low of 3.23 billion bushels in 1974-75 when
feeding was unprofitable and corn prices averaged $3.03 per bushel to a
high of 4.52 billion bushels in 1979-80 when U.S. average farm price was
$2.52 per bushel. Amounts fed vary by adjusting livestock slaughter
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weights, amount of time beef animals are on pasture vs. in feedlots, extent
of culling of breeding stock, substitution of protein meal for grain,
roughage feeding and other factors.
U.S. corn feeding in 1982-83 is expected to total 4.5 billion bushels,
slightly below the record 4.52 billion bushels fed in 1979-80 but 13 percent
above 12 years earlier and 39 percent above the recent low point in 1974-75.
Combined feeding of the four feed grains is expected to be about two percent
greater than 12 years ago.
In addition to the changing composition of the U.S. meat supply,
domestic grain feeding has not trended upward because of (1) continued
improvements in livestock breeding, (2) better management of feeding opera
tions, (3) development of new growth stimulants in cattle feeding, and (4)
increased levels of protein feeding. Soybean meal feeding in the U.S. in
1982-83 is expected to be 45 percent above 12 years earlier.
In short, macro economic policies contributing to a strong U.S. economy
will generate only small increases in the quantity of meat the U.S. demands
and hence will encourage only a small increase in grain feeding. Thus,
domestic increases in utilization of meat and feed grains in a recovery
likely will fall far short of utilizing our current excess production
capacity.
Incomes in animal agriculture however are very sensitive, to changes in
meat prices at the consumer level and to changes in prices for feed. Some
U.S. livestock and poultry enterprises suffered significant income loss in
1983 as a direct result of feed prices rising rapidly in response to FOR and
PIK.
Ik
Feed utilization by livestock began to increase as grain prices fell in
Fall '82, By June '83 feed grain prices rose 60% relative to their low's.
Feeding margins narrowed sharply but some planned expansion of meat
production and future downward pressure on meat animals prices may also have
been averted. In the long run livestock volume adjusts inversely with grain
price. U.S. meat livestock seem to be about the only flexible component to
balance the food equation. It is possible to dramatically curtail feed use
by rapidly raising grain prices. However the adjustment causes heavy losses
to feeders. The current high grain price is not the result of short grain
supply. We are sending a false signal to feeders to curtail feed use. The
garbled signal is the direct result of scarce free stocks. Stocks are
excessive and locked up but free stocks are artifically small until 1
October '83.
Corn processing into sweeteners, alcohol, etc. has been a strong growth
area and will likely expand further in future years but only if several
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supportive government policies remain in place* U.S. corn processing and
seed use increased by 131 percent from 1971-72 to the current marketing
year, rising from 390 million bushels in 1971-72 to an expected record 900
million this season. At the current rate of utilization, this category
accounts for 12 percent of the total demand for U.S. corn, up from 8 percent
12 years earlier. Since by-products of the alcohol-fuels industry are
largely exported to the European Community and compete there with U.S. corn
and soybean meal, these figures modestly over-state the net growth in demand
for U.S. crops as a result of increased corn processing. Growth in the corn
processing sector appears to be relatively insensitive to the U.S. general
economy. Processing corn into sweeteners is strongly influenced, however by
U.S. sugar policies including import restrictions and support levels. U.S.
sugar supports at 17 to 20^ per pound (about twice world price levels) and
strict quotas as import restrictions have enhanced the competitive position
of high-fructose corn sweeteners. Corn processing into alcohol also is
strongly related to reduced federal and state road fuel tax policies which
encourage the use of alcohol fuels. Future growth of the alcohol fuels
industry will depend not only on continued fuel tax policies but also on
continued unrestricted access to the European Community by-product feed
market, where much of the by-product feeds of the alcohol industry are
sold.
The need for storage or supply control will probably not be reduced
significantly by economic recovery accelerating domestic meat consumption
and grain feeding. However, if domestic policy encouraging sweeteners and
alcohol-fuel derived from corn were discontinued the need for storage and
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supply control might, eventually increase by nearly 1/2 billion bushels or
nearly 1/3 the size of 1983 PIK corn payments.
Impact of food policy and promotion
In addition to the small negative effect of national economic policies
and the small positive effect of sugar and gasohol policies, three other
domestic demand related topics should be examined. What are the impact of
recent efforts to curtail government food assistance programs? What is the
impact of dietary recommendations to reduce fat and increase cereal and
vegetable consumption? Is there a significant potential role in domestic
demand expansion for commodity promotional programs?
Food assistance program expenditures for low income families such as
food stamps, reduced cost school lunch, etc., totaled $15.8 billion last
fiscal year. Their constraint in 1983 probably made only a modest slight
contraction in total domestic food demand. Food stamps is the largest
costing about $11 billion (and have been reduced 3%) food stamps supplement
income to help meet basic nutritional needs of about 32 million individuals
in families who are financially needy. Recent reforms have tried to tighten
up the administration and limit eligibility only to families and individuals
who do not have income or assets to meet food needs. The addition to gross
farm income in 1982 from food assistance is estimated at about $1.6 billion
about 1 percent of gross but nearly 10% of net farm income.
Relative to $16 billion in total food assistance expenditures, even
$1.6 billion addition to net income is small but significant to agriculture.
There is of course some "slippage" in food assistance programs just as there
is in land retirement. Recipients of food assistance increase total food
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consumption expenditure by about 40 percent as much as the value of the food
assistance received. Low income recipients make a rational allocation of
limited income resources and spend less of income from other sources on food
if food stamps are available to them. Analysts estimate 1 billion of the
slippage is from high income consumers who spend less on food because their
taxes are higher to pay for food stamps.
Cancer, heart disease and obesity concerns have led to new dietary
recommendations and guidelines. Farm commodity groups have protested the
reduced demand for animal products they expect from these recommendations.
The impact on food demands is difficult to document and measure. Recent
USDA research indicated that two-thirds of U.S. households changed diets for
health or nutrition reasons during the late 1970's. Fifteen to 20 percent
of households reported they believe they now consume a diet less high in fat
cholesterol. Dietary recommendations are information. Consumption choices
remain matters of individual preference. Only clearly harmful additives or
contaminated products are restricted from the market by the Food and Drug
Administration. The role of government dietary recommendations probably is
minor relative to all other information provided consumers about the impli
cation of scientific information. Although Americans eat over 200 pounds of
meat which is more than adequate nutritionally this is less than the con
sumption needed to fully employ all agricultural resources under current
weak foreign demand.
New product development, such as boneless cooked ham, and consumer
information and educational efforts by the private food industry such as the
fast food industry's promotional efforts for chicken probably have more
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effect in expanding demand for specific product than dietary recommendation
It seems clear that successful promotion of a particular product may
increase demand for that product but the expansion is often a substitution
at the expense of some other farm product. The net impact of additional
promotional efforts on farm products probably would be very limited.
Political and public welfare consequences of public promotion of more
domestic meat consumption to reduce need for supply control probably would
be highly negative. Private sector product and market development efforts
including exports of high value processed products probably offer some
potential for expansion of U.S. agri-business employment and increased
foreign exchange earnings.
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V. Three Alternative Policy Approaches to Managing U.S. Farm Prices and
Incomes
Charles Gratto
From many statements about the farm problem and what price and income
policies are supposed to accomplish, these four are the recurring themes.
1) Returns to factors of production in the farm sector are not but should be
the same as returns to factors of production elsewhere in the economy and
the incomes of farm families are below but should be on a par with incomes
of non-farm households; 2) U.S. consumers are not but should be thankful and
willing to pay more because they have access to a secure and safe food
supply at reasonable prices; 3) government farm programs are not but should
be efficient, i.e., accomplish goals at minimum cost; 4) benefits of farm
programs should not but do get capitalized into land values and should not
but do accrue largely to larger than family farms.
Only three general responses are available to the federal government to
deal with excess agricultural capacity. One is to fine~tune the present
legislation — public assistance to farmer-owned storage and voluntary
supply control by public rental of land. A second response is to reduce
government supply management, increase the play of market forces, and
support farm incomes by checks from the Treasury. A third pattern is
increase government supply control and regulation of production by more
spending or perhaps by mandatory quotas of allotments i^ approved by
producers or Congress.
Some specific actions consistent with fine tuning of the existing
legislation to reduce cost include: 1) putting an upper limit on the size
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of farmer-owned reserve, 2) broadening the $50,000 limit per farm family on
land diversion, deficiency payments and payments in kind, 3) lowering the
loan rate (up to 10%) for 1984 and freezing target prices at 1983
levels or lowering them, 4) extend the PIK program but limit it to 40
million acres and institute a system of national bidding to save government
cost.
The main features of a "reduced government/more demand driven" policy
are as follows:
1, Market should clear since adequate stocks have been accumulated.
Utilization and production should be planned by the private sector
in response to market clearing prices.
2. Direct deficiency payments limited to $50,000 per farm family should
be the main government action to protect farm family living to some
extent. Land values and net worth would not be protected. Adjust
ment and free play of prices would clear markets, promote consump
tion, stimulate exports and curtail excess capacity.
Some actions consistent with the demand driven pattern are: 1) reduce
the loan rates to 90% of the variable costs incurred by large commercial
farms, 2) phase out export subsidies, limit cost sharing for farmer-owned
reserves, land diversion and payment-in-kind, and 3) continue a very
aggressive trade promotion, food aid, and export credit stance.
The main features of increased government management of production are
follows:
1. Control market supply and production of agricultural products year-
to-year to clear grain markets within 10-15% of large efficient
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farmers cost of production. Government should own stocks and build
or liquidate them to limit season average price variation. Produc
tion control would keep stocks below 15 to 20% of utilization. Farm
income would be obtained through the market not from the Treasury.
2. Farm production could also be managed for resource conservation but
the primary goal would be cost of production with consumer welfare
and balance of payment as secondary goals.
Some actions consistent full cost of production by voluntary supply
control are 1) expand land diversion payments, 2) target diversion to row
crops on fragile lands, 3) retire land where ground water is used for
agriculture beyond the sustainable yield load, 4) enough government stocks
insure with 95% confidence that prices would stay within 15% of cost of
production and 5) the $50,000 limit should be removed.
Below are some possible actions to obtain full cost of production via a
mandatory supply control program.
(These programs would depart substantially from past voluntary
approaches): 1) land use quotas might be set for all classes of cropland
limiting accreage per section of major grain and row crops. 2) No diversion
payments. 3) Compliance enforced by aerial photographs and penalties
(taxes) assessed to any owners of land planted in excess of quotas. 4)
Mandatory marketing quotas in bushels or pounds would be issued to
producers of processed products like wheat, soybeans and cotton. 5)
Referendum could enact quotas of various sizes and impose penalties for
marketing over quota. 6) Excess stocks would be helped by producers as in
Canada.
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Land production or marketing quotas could be restricted for fragile
lands and water use not in the national interest and other goals.
Each of the three patterns sketched here has costs and benefits. Each
distributes the costs and benefits in different ways, to different partici
pants, by different mechanisms. Each could result in similar levels of farm
prices or incomes, but would have different consumer and taxpayer costs and
degree of intervention in agricultural markets. Each poses a different set
of consequences for resource conservation, structure of size and number of
farms, rural development, transportation, land values, net worth, stability,
and agri-business.
In the section which follows the implications of using each of the
three patterns are analyzed.
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VT-A. Consumers, Taxpayers and Distribution of
Costs and Benefits
Arnold Paulsen
The appearance of agricultural excess capacity and falling grain prices
since summer 1981 created the opportunity for a massive redistribution (of
perhaps $5-10 billion) of income away from producers, especially grain
farmers, toward consumers. The 1982-83 storage assistance and supply
control were provided at taxpayers' expense. They limited the potential
price decline (and hence the transfer) to less than half what it might have
been. The intervention at taxpayers' expense raised domestic food
expenditures, of course relative to what they would have been. At times of
world grain shortage, such as 1972-197 5, or at the time of strong foreign
demand, as in 1979 and *81, the process worked in the other direction and
farm price Increases transferred $5-10 billion of consumers' real income per
year to producers. IXiring those good times, anticipation of continued high
farm prices and continued high land Incomes caused land buyers to bid up the
value of farmland and the national estimate of equity in production assets
Increased by 25-40 billion per year and. Over $180 billion of unrealized
paper wealth was created in 1974-1979.
Large commercial farmers selling over $200,000 per year produce nearly
half of all U.S. farm output. They are very low cost producers and
aggressive bidders for farm land for expansion ^en canmodity prices are
strong. Some in this group are also, however, very vulnerable to cash flow
shortage when farm prices drop. Only a small proportion, about 10% of
farmers selling around $40,000 per year have burdensome debts. Significant
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off-farm income also may also help them survive during low prices. As a
group, small farmers have been less vulnerable to bankruptcy. During the
recent downturn large commercial grain fanners heavily in debt at high
interest rates were the first to experience cash flow problems. Large
commercial farms receive significant benefits from price supports even if
they do not participate. Government cash benefits received after October
1982 contributed much to highly leveraged farmers survival in 1982-83.
By July 1982 about 30% of farm borrowers were loaned up to their prac
tical limit and even nore grain farmers would have faced cash flow problems
in 1983 if grain prices had continued at Fall, 1982, levels. Voluntary or
involuntary liquidation however affected less than 1% of farms in 1982,
More liquidation, especially among the highly leveraged farmers, would
have occurred in 1983 without the injection of additional government pay
ments beginning in Fall 1982 e.g., diversion and deficiency payments, non
recourse loans and PIK, The massive 1983 land rental of 80 million acres
reduced coats and the need to borrow money. If low prices had continued into
1983 all the land would have been farmed; because of prices above variable
costs, however, the value of land and rental rates would have declined.
Some land would have been released by large units with credit problems but
this land probably would have been taken over by other relatively large
units with adequate machine and borrowing capacity. Probably near 50% of
production would contintie to come from large farms.
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Distribution Impacts
Each of the three alternative approaches has distinctly different
distribution of the unavoidable costs of carrying current excess agriculture
capacity. Without some intervention farmers would suffer almost all of the
burden. With current programs the burden is shared aiiK>ng 1) taxpayers, 2)
consumers via food prices above market during levels, 3) agri-business via
supply control and 4) farmers through prices below cost of production.
With supply control via jaandatory controls the cost would fall on
consumers and agri-business. Taxpayers could nearly avoid cost for excess
capacity if agriculture would accept the discipline and more central
direction of agricultural production.
With a more market oriented policy, adjustment costs would be borne by
farmers and consumers depending on price levels. In low price periods
farmers would bear. In time of shortage consumers would bear the burden
through higher food prices. To the extent deficiency payments or other
direct payments are made to ease low fanner Income the taxpayer will also
share in the cost of the program.
The current program seems to require about $15 billion of expenditures
annually by taxpayers to protect the capacity of farmers to produce Price
supports take real income away from consumers; half of whom earn less than
$15,000/year income and little wealth. Fine tuning of present voluntary
programs probably could raise income transfer efficiency and reduce tax
payers cost to maintain agricultural capacity. However voluntary programs
are expensive, and land unemployment Is more expensive than reducing produc
tion by not mining so much water or applying so much fertilizer. In
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general I surplus accumulation and voluntary supply control of the 1982 and
1983 program—type create a net social loss, i.e. consumers and taxpayers
sacrifice more than farmers gain in net income. Farm prices were kept above
the market clearing level by storing 50 million tons of the 1982 crop. Con
sumers were denied about $4.0 billion of available production. In 1983,
total production was reduced by unemploying 80 million acres of land.
Consumers at horoe and abroad will be worse off by $5 billion dollars — less
farm goods to be consumed frcan the U.S. Farm prices at home and abroad will
be higher than they would have been, that is above market clearing levels,
because of supply control. Total consumer expenditures on 1983 U.S. farm
goods were raised $3 to 5 billion as a result and purchase of non-farm goods
will be reduced by an equal amount. The costs of 1983 supply control were
made at taxpayers* expense of about $15 billion.
Less Food 5
More spent 5
Land Rent
Total 25
The total cost to consumers plus taxpayers of the reduced marketing and
reduced production may be about $25 billion. Net farm inccme may increase
less than 10 billion. Farm supply will lose income but farm financial
stability is improved.
Preventing production rather than storing surplus production should be
a cheaper method in terms of taxpayer costs to retire excess capacity. For
1984 it may be possible to save money and prevent production by a voluntary
biddir^ procedure. Among low profit land owners, the cost of renting land
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may be less than $1.50 per bushel of excess capacity idled. The cost of
Interest and storage for 3 years is also about $1.50 per bushel so \rtien
stocks get large and the prospect is for storage longer than 3 years,
diversion of marginal land should be cheaper. However, land retirement
purchased in 1983 probably had a cost of over $3 per bushel of capacity
idled. In 1983 the actual potential yield was probably more than 50% of the
program yield but the cash payment rates of $1.50 per bushel and the payment
in kind rates of 80% of program yield probably paid more than would have
been necessary to obtain the particular acres retired.
Only if it were possible to shift away from voluntary programs to
mandatory control could the taxpayer cost of income transfer to farms by
supply control be reduced significantly. So long as supply control is
voluntary, many acres and dollars will be needed to retire our excess capa
city. To maintain prices near cost of production is very expensive. For
example, if Iowa farmers expect season average corn prices for the 1984 crop
to be above $2.65, because that is the loan rate, only a few will offer to
reduce corn acreage in exchange for a payment of $1.50 per tushel.
However if corn prices were expected to average $2.25, with a 25% chance of
less than $1.90 and 10% chance of over $2.50, more acres would be offered at
$1.50 but fewer acres would be needed.
In principle, the cheapest tax cost of obtaining full cost of produc
tion is if producers accept mandatory controls in a referendum. Compliance
acre allotments or production quotas probably could be monitored at reason
able expense today. Aerial photographs could identify excess planting and
assessed penalty or tax per acre would be possible. If supply control did
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not have to be purchased, the Income transfer would be only from consumers
to producers.
On the other hand for the "less government/more demand driven" policy,
the direction of transfer would be entirely from taxpayer to farmer. If
prices were at market clearing level no consumer sacrifice would occur
during periods of excess capacity. In the past, taxpayer cost of direct
payments has been limited to $50,000 per farm operator family. If so, only
partial protectioa would be offered to large producers. The risk, of low
prices and excess capacity would fall heavily on the large, lower cc»t more
efficient producers. Consumers would obtain food at market clearing prices.
During access capacity prices would fall below cost of production toward
variable cost of efficient operators (perhaps $1.25 for corn). If prices
were expected below variable costs it would pay to not plant. The capacity
of agriculture would only be partly maintained. Machinery and labor on
small farms and part of that on larger farms would be maintained. If
transfers via direct payments from the treasury were not extended beyond
$50,000 to larger farms, this might create incentive to disinvest, or break
up into, additional units.
Cost of direct payments would be zero. With a $50,000 limit, tax
payer's cost would also be limited. The tax cost and big farm limitation of
direct payments is feared by agriculture. The fact that limited direct pay
ments would not cover all production capacity means agricultural capacity
would not be fully maintained.
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VI-B, Impact of Alternative Farm Programs on the Agri Business
and Transportation Complex
C. P. Baumel
In 1981 farmers spent $53.1 billion for purchases of production inputs
from off-farm suppliers. This $53 billion includes expenditures on farm
machinery and trucks — including operating and repair costs — fertilizer,
chemicals, seed, and manufactured feeds. In addition, the costs of
marketing the food beyond the farm gate were $208 billion. These off-farm
purchases and marketing costs of $261 billion exceed the 1981 gross farm
income of $166.8 billion by almost $100 billion.
During the decade of the 19708, major investments were made in the
agri-business and transportation complex to handle an ever increasing growth
in agricultural exports. During the early half of the decade, most agri
business and transportation companies were cautious in their investment
programs because of uncertainty over future export growth. However, the
growth in exports continued and even accelerated during the last half of the
decade and the agri business and transportation industries were faced with
increasing demands for grain storage and handling capacity, for farm inputs
including fertilizer, chemicals, petroleum and farm machinery, and public
outrage at the continuing shortage of rail cars and barges. Encouraged by
these growing demands as well as by forecasts of ever increasing growth in
grain exports and by generous federal government investment tax credits and
low interest loans, the agri-business and transportation complex made huge
investments in capacity. By early 1980, however, export growth leveled off
and even declined in 1982 and 1963. Thus, the investment decisions of the
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late 1970s resulted in large overcapacity of the agri-business and trans
portation industries. The farm machinery, fertilizer, railroad, and barge
industries were particularly placed under great stress from the leveling off
and then the decline in grain exports. The farm machinery industry has
faced major labor layoffs, plant closings, mergers and near bankruptcies.
For the first time in history, agriculture has the "luxury" of excess trans
portation capacity. About 30,000 rail grain cars currently sit idle and
about 30 percent of the barges are either tied up or in "slow down" opera
tions. Some grain elevators are facing bankruptcy because of the heavy
burden of monthly payment on leased rail cars that are sitting idle because
of reduced grain sales. Some barge companies are hauling grain traffic at
below variable cost to avoid the large costs of tying up and storing barges.
Given this background, what are the impacts of alternative farm programs on
the agri-business and transportation complex?
PIK Program
The preliminary estimates indicate that the PIK program has resulted in
the following percentage reductions in crop acreages:
Corn 28
Wheat 11
Cotton 28
Rice 33
These acreage reductions have, of course, resulted in reduced farm input
sales during the 1983 planting season. While data on input sales are not
available, bank representatives suggest that monthly financial reports indi
cate that sales of some inputs are not as low as had been expected earlier.
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For example, preliminary data indicate that nitrogen sales reductions are
significantly less than acreage reduction because farmers applied more
nitrogen fertilizer. However, phosphate and potash sales are off sharply.
On balance, PIK could reduce fertilizer purchases by 12 to 14 percent.
Thus, the PIK program will add to the already depressed conditions in the
fertilizer industry which is operating at less than 70 percent of capacity.
Seed sales are expected to decline 13 to 17 percent; however, this
reduction could be tempered somewhat by higher plant population plantings
and by cover crop plantings. Petroleum sales declines could be tempered
somewhat by seeding field work and mowing of diverted acres which are
planted to cover crops like oats and legumes. On balance, energy sales are
expected to decline on the order of 10 percent.
Farm machinery repair and maintenance expenditures are expected to
decline 12 to 15 percent, principally because of reduced usage. However,
increased farm income from PIK could temper the decline in farm machinery
sales to 2 to 3 percent.
Manufactured feed sales are expected to decline as PIK results in
higher grain prices which will increase the cost of manufactured feed.
On balance, the farm supply industries will face sharp reductions in
income from PIK which will add to the already depressed conditions of
existing overcapacity. A second year PIK program would further depress farm
supply sales.
On the marketing side, reduced 1983 production will result in
reductions in grain handling, drying, and storage income to the
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grain elevator industry which is already burdened with overcapacity. The
extent of the decline in elevator income will depend on the yield of the
reduced acreage.
PIK will have secondary impacts on the marketing chain. As PIK
increases grain and feed prices, livestock feeding is likely to become less
profitable which will eventually result in reduced livestock marketings and
lower income and sales of livestock marketing and slaughter firms.
On the transportation side, PIK could provide a temporary increase in
the demand for rail transportation as grain from existing stocks is moved to
deficit areas* However, reduced 1983 grain production and higher grain
prices will likely reduce both domestic and export grain sales. The reduced
sales will translate directly into further reductions in revenues to the
rail and barge industries which are already suffering from declining
revenues and a huge oversupply of rail cars and barges.
In summary, the PIK program will undoubtedly have major negative
impacts on the farm supply, farm marketing and transportation sectors which
made major capacity investments in the late 70s and 1980 to respond to
growing demands and government incentives to increase their capacities.
A second year PIK program would also continue to decline in the U.S.
share of world grain trade by signaling to the world that the U.S. is
willing to make the adjustments in world grain supply. A declining share of
world grain trade would add to the major surplus capacity problem of the
grain marketing and transportation system.
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Tight Government Supply Control Alternative
Stronger government supply controls would have essentially the same
types but greater negative impacts on the agri-business and transportation
complex as the PIK program. If a tighter supply control program were
targeted to reduce production in the most erosive soils and on irrigated
areas, the program would tend to force much of the adjustment on these
areas. This could result in closing down and perhaps bankrupting many of
the farm supply and marketing firms in these areas.
Market Oriented Program
A market oriented program would tend to provide some relief to the
agri-business and transportation complex through lower grain prices and
higher domestic and export grain sales. This impact would use part of the
major overcapacity of the system. However, a market oriented system would
still face the problems of high interest rates, a strong U.S. dollar, low
worldwide income growth, and major debt problems of many countries.
44
VI-^, Financial and Structural Impact
Mike Boehlje
A continuation of the current or existing farm programs with some
modifications would insulate farmers to some degree from market supply and
demand forces. This insulation results in Increased income stability for
farmers and reduced risk. Consequently, farm incomes do not decline as much
as they might in years of excess supply or slack demand, nor do they rise as
much as would be possible in periods of excess demand and reduced supply.
Since land and other fixed resource values are a function of income, the
increased stability in income also results in larger and more stable
capitalized values. Capitalized resource values seem to be relatively
sticky downward. Any government policy whit^ stabilizes incomes by
establishing a floor on the down side results in larger resource values.
Land values adjust upward with increases in incomes, but only partially
adjust downward with decreased incomes.
Any government policy such as target prices or dairy supports which
includes escalator clauses or upward adjustments in loan rates, create a
spiral in incomes and hence in asset values. This is not only because
higher price supports mean higher incomes, but also because of reduced risk
on the downside to income and land value adjustment.
Analyses have indicated that the structural implication of downside
security is to favor expansion of large and hi^ equity farming operations
but works to the competitive disadvantage of smaller and highly leveraged
farm operators. Any support price program that Includes land values in the
Indexing formula could result in significant increases in land values and
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relatively more benefits for larger rather than smaller producers. Any
modifications in the existing programs such as the $50,000 limitation on
payments vAiich was declared not to apply to PIK in 1983 or a 10% lowering of
the loan rate and lowering or freezing of the target prices would reduce the
price enhancement and asset stabilization benefits of this program* If more
fluctuations in incomes and reduced financial stability occurred relative to
current more rigid programs, large highly leverage farms would be in the
greatest difficulty.
Government payment programs also favor large farms. Only 1 percent of
farmers received nearly 30 percent of direct government payments in 1978.
Several other studies have shown monetary benefits of earlier public farm
programs to be size related. Current price support mechanisms, when
effective, also bring benefits in relation to the level of output and size
of farm. 1982 PIK payments had no upper limits. Some very large farms thus
claimed payments — as high as $250,000 to $300,000 — just as during the
1960s.
With market clearing prices under a demand driven type of government
program, the potential role of market prices increases. The incomes of
large operators in the agricultural sector would be expected to fluctuate
significantly more than they have in the past. More market exposure in the
future under such an alternative would result in increased financial risk
for all agriculture but a higher failure rate on the part of leveraged
farmers and much more widely fluctuationg asset values. More variable and
uncertain land rents and returns might be capitalized at a lower
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rate. If periods of <fecreasing prices of farmland became more likely, a
much less stable and financial resilient agricultural economy would result.
The destruction of ^i^alth from capital losses would reduce the equity base
and consequently the ability of farmers to obtain debt financing from con
ventional lenders. This decreased wealth and the increased risk in agricul
ture would result in more dependence on government credit sources, or
require higher interest rates from private sector lenders to provide
adequate funds.
Implications of market clearing prices with $50,000 limits on payments
would necessitate recognition that financial failure in agriculture (not
only on the part of the least efficient, but also on the part of many
efficient farmers whD happen to be highly leveraged) is acceptable from a
public policy perspective. To soften the impact of a policy that is more
demand oriented might be to implement a government sponsored adjustment
program that would facilitate the dissolution of large farms and the outward
migration from agriculture of all wlw encounter financial stress. Sudden
transition would require then to incur substantial liquidation losses*
Market clearing prices might also mean the increased risk in agriculture may
encourage less efficient production. Some high quality, large fann mana
gerial ai^ other resources would be allocated to risk reduction rather than
to increased efficiency and reduced cost and some might leave agriculture.
The third option — stricter supply control at a price level near the
production, would result in more stability in income and resource values
than at present. It would promote the trend to large farms and more
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financial leverage by farms. The level of inccraies and values would depend
on how effective and secure farmers found the supply management program and
whether the "desirable or acceptable" level of supply and prices provided a
profit. The economic implications of either mandatory or voluntary control
would be the same* Structural change in agriculture would continue to
follow the impacts and trends under the current program. The financial and
structural effects are not affected by means as much as price and income
results. The increased financial stability under a rigid supply control
system would encourage private sector lenders to provide more capital to
agriculture at lower rates of interest compared to the riskier environnent
of a demand driven program.
Supply control programs encourage farm enlargement particularly on
farms with underemployed large machine units. As they took land out of
production for the direct payments associated with set aside or land retire
ment programs on their existing unit, these farmers were inclln«I to rent or
buy more land so they could attain a more complete utilization of their
machine and labor resources. Too, over a period of time, fann commodity
programs provided a source of capital gains to fanners, with the largest
gains going to the largest farmers. Cochrane indicates that these gains
amounted to $76 billion during the period 1950-1964.
The possibility of an agricultural industry composed of industrialized
superfarms is now a possibility in prospect. One half of all fed cattle
marketed cone from 400 large feedlots and 16,000 poultry producers accounted
for 90 percent of annual production in the last year. Other enterprises
which are not tied to land could follow a similar route. Even crop farms
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which are tied to the land also have eminent prospects of "bigness." A
modern 4-wheel drive tractor operated by one person can pull up to 80 feet
of equipment behind it.
The main increase in farm size has come from family farms which are
already large. While the dialogue has been in terms or a conventional
family farm, our public programs servicing farms have favored farm enlarge
ment and a structural change towards supersize family farms.
The decline in real price of machine capital relative to labor gave
rise to a push towards larger and fewer farms. Power and machine units have
come in increasingly large lumps of capital. The high mechanization and
Industrialization of livestock production also have come to have high capi
tal investments. Fixed costs of farming have increased accordingly and to
attain breakeven and profit levels, farms and enterprises have had to grow
larger. This process is not finished. From the very high profits from
farming during much of the 1970s, many farmers bought large 4-wheel drive
tractors of 200 horsepower and upwards, with accompanying 12-row to i6-row
machinery. These large units have high fixed costs and are underutilized on
the majority farms \iAiere they now exist. This condition maintains a pres
sure towards further farm enlargement, with only high rental and purchase
prices of land holding it partially in check. Of course, the extremely high
ratio of capital to labor that now characterizes the structure of agricul
ture prohibits all but the wealthy from beginning or expanding their farm.
Tax policy also has been structured to better allow large land holdings
to be held intact. Both income and estate tax have this tendency. In a
somewhat similar vein, the family farm corporation has become a legal tool
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for the maintenance of large farms. While farmers often point to the cor
poration as a threat to family farms, the vast majority of corporations in
agriculture are family corporations organized so the family can raiuce
inheritance taxes and maintain a large land holding. Both the advent of
greater use of the corporation and easing of death tax burdens have encourag
ed the continuation of aggregations of wealth through time in the form of
four assets*
Hence, both the public developmental policies and the compensation
policies of the last five decades have served as incentives encouraging
larger farms. While the preamble to most recent farm policy legislation is
laced with statements of protecting the family farm, the legislation typi
cally, even though sometimes unwittingly, has encouraged use of more
resources per farm and larger farms. Augmented by relative resource endow
ments, and prices and technologies vAiich provide scale advantages, it has
had the general effect of favoring bigger farms. Our dominant national
policies have been towards larger farms — and not for smaller farms. With
a couple of 4-wheel drive power units per farm, Iowa readily could be farmed
with 16,000 farms, rather than its current 121,000. Predictions are for a
decrease of farms nationally to 1,8 million in 2000 but the potential exists
for even fewer but larger farms. The nation's 50,000 largest farms repre
sent less than 2 percent of all farms but produce more than 36 percent of
the total agricultural output. If the rest of agriculture were organized as
this 2 percent, the nation's output could be produced by 135,000 farms — or
an average of around 3,000 per state. Similarly, the number of farms with
sales of over $200,000 now is about 2.5 percent of all farms, but these
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farms produce over 40 percent of total output. If all farms were organized
like this group, the number of farms would average only 2,000 per state.
The largest one-fourth of farms now produce 85 percent of total output.
Coffman estimates that 125,000 farms, produced one-half of farm sales in
1974 and that if current size trends continue, 70,000 farms could produce
one-half of all farm output in year 2000, In other words, only 140,000
farms, an average of about 2,800 per state, would need to exist.
There are no great scale economies or cost advantages to consumers and
society as farms become very large. Scale or cost advantages are largely
exhausted by the time Com Belt grain farms attain 480 acres in size or
produce 2,000 swine annually.^ Cost advantages are small beyond levels
such as above and are not Important to society when its own food, plus a
large amount for export, is produced with less than 4 percent of the
nation's labor force and with less than 7 percent of its capital stock.
However, just as there are no significant cost economies for larger farms,
neither are there any important diseconomies. Hence, as farmers enlarge
their units they suffer no penalty through the market in per unit costs and
they can increase their personal Incomes and capital investment. With
farmland prices increasing more rapidly than inflation over the past decade,
these investments have given large capital gains.
^For some Indications of Cost Economies, see: Chan et al,, [3],
Crall et al., [7] and Ball and Heady [2].
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VI~D« Impact of Farm Structure on Rural Areas
Earl Heady
The structure of agriculture has impacts beyond the farm gate and on
into the rural community at large. Capital good intensification of
agriculture and the decline in the farm work force and population have been
accompanied by a reduced economic and social viability of rural communities.
The supply of human services in rural areas has generally declined in
quantity and increased in price under the trend to fewer farms and farm
families. Our own study indicated that total farm income, rural area
employment and income stand to be reduced when farms are larger. The social
and economic environment of typical rural canmunities which lack
industrialization opportunities will deteriorate further if farm size makes
the leap which is possible under current technologies and farm enlargement
possibilities.
Most of the institutions and infrastructure of rural communities was
developed around a large number of relatively small family farms. This
infrastructure framework may need to be changed in the future. For example,
farm-to-market roads established in the Corn Belt many decades back were
oriented to 160 acre farms. Is society obligated to maintain the heavy
investment in rural roads around every section of land when farms grow to
1,200 and 2,000 acres? The justification seems to melt away as farms become
large industrialized enterprises. Similar questions can be raised relative
CO other public infrastructure investment in rural communities.
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Each rural area has econoiaic activities from s^everal national sectors
— farming, transportation, retail, private services and government. These
services are somewhat interdependent locally but each is strongly influenced
and linked to the conditions and cycles of similar activities In other parts
of the country. Price decreases or reduced production or depressions in
local business activities have direct effect on owners and workers in agri
culture or manufacturing but also have similar but smaller effects on jobs
and incomes in related local activities like services, retail, finance and
transportation. Supply controls that specifically focus on marginal lands
not only will have a different Impact on producers in different geographic
regions of the U.S. (Corn Belt vs Che Southeast, tor example), but also on
the input supply, processing firms and rural conununities in general in these
regions. Concentrating the production adjustments in marginal producing
areas may accomplish efficiency goals, hut will result in sip;nifleant income
distribution and equity issues for farmers and agri-buslnessraen in these
communities.
Policies to Maintain Family Farms
The public could take some of the following steps if it iJ5 serious
about maintaining a population of efficient and modest sized family farms:
the level of price supports could be made to decline with size of farm,
dropping to zero at a size beyond v;hich society decides public support is no
longer merited. Similarly, levels of direct payments from supply control
participation or related sources could have a cutoff for rtodesL sized family
farms which are of a scale consistent with the agrlclimatic and market
conditions surrounding them. A farm size cutoff would be more effective
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than a monetary limit of $50,000, as in present le)Jislatlon- loo, price
support and payinent benefits could be limited to fartM of present sizes.
For example. If two 240-acre farms operated by A and B were maintained in
operation, they would continue to realize ongoing program benefits.
Howeverj if A purchased B's farm, A would be eligible for benefits only on
the original unit and not on land purchased from B. There also could be
special farm acquisition and credit programs to catalyze the entry of young
capital-short for farmers into agriculture. The Beginning Farmer Program of
North Dakota, the Saskatchewan Land Bank Program and other "land and
homestead acts" for young farmers are examples on a modest scale.
A further strong restraint would be a progressive property tax on land
acreage and animal numbers. The strength of the tax in restraining size
would depend upon the rate that it increases with size. An absolute upper
limit in acres, as already used in some countries, could be used and would
be effective* Parallel measures could be used on livestock herds, b'inally,
a graduated gross sales tax could be levied.
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S—E. Impact on Natural Resources Conservation
J. Miranowski
The adequacy of soil and water resources to meet future demands fot
agricultural output is coming into question. Continuing erosion of top soil
resources will jeopardize the long run productivity of many cropland acres
in Iowa and across the nation. Likewise, raining of exhaustible water
resources, such as the Ogallala Aquifer, and rising pumping costs for
irrigation of crops currently in surplus are leading to concern over the
feasibility of widespread irrigation.
The choice of farm price and commodity programs has a direct impact on
the use of these scarce natural resources both in positive and negative
ways. For example, high farm prices from strong domestic and agricultural
export demands encourage the cultivation of fragile lands and increased
water withdrawals. Low prices and targeted efforts to control output may
encourage the retirement of fragile and less productive cropland. Energy,
soil, and water conservation could be promoted by judicious supply control
during periods of excess capacity but have not been.
The next three sections will attempt to consider the impacts on soil
and water conservation resulting from (1) continuing the current program
focus, (2) expanding the federal government's role, and (3) placing greater
reliance on market forces.
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Continuing Current Programs
The current policy efforts both in farm commodity programs and soil and
water conservation activities leave room for improvement. 1983 set-aside
and paid diversion programs probably had very limited impacts on reducing
soil erosion in Iowa but might have had a large effect. Unfortunately, the
PIK program announcement came too late for adequate 1983 crop planning. In
Iowa, many fields had already been tilled in the Fall of 1982 and conserving
crops were not established by many participants. In the absence of growing
crops or adequate crop residue to cover the surface, the soil erosion rate
may increase on PIK acres because it is essentially fallow cropland. More
timely announcement of program opportunities, requirement of residue or
timely cover crops, and retirement of the more fragile croplands would be an
improvement in current program efforts.
Current program efforts should have a positive impact on reducing water
withdrawals and in encouraging long-term national allocation of water
supplies in areas where supplies are not recharged.
Efforts are underway by the Administration to reduce expenditures on
soil and water conservation programs, especially the cost-sharing
components. Such a reduction will only serve to increase soil erosion, all
other things equal. An even more serious question involves the
cost-effectiveness of current programs. Approximately one-fourth of our
cropland base suffers moderate to serious productivity threat from sheet and
r-\l erosion. Yet in a survey of AC? participants, about one-half of the
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soil conservation practices were being established on cropland eroding below
productivity-threatening levels. Additionally, disproportionate shares of
the conservation funds are expended in regions with limited erosion problems
and insignificant contributions to agricultural output.
The targeting scheme being adopted by ASCS and SCS to concentrate
funding in areas with serious erosion problems is a step in the right
direction, but the program is too small and too dispersed. A productivity
based targeting scheme for the 5-10 percent of the cropland with the worst
erosion problems would be an improvement.
Although better coordination of all farm program activities is to be
applauded, cross-compliance between conservation and other programs (e.g.,
commodity credit) is no panacea. The main limitation is that the farmers
responsible for most of the erosion are not necessarily those who would be
reached by cross-compliance. For example, operators receiving certain
Farmers Home Administration loans would be required to have and implement a
conservation plan for their farms. First, relatively few farmers utilize
this credit source. Second, eligible farmers on land with minor erosion
problems incur limited erosion control costs to participate in the FmHA
program. Their counterparts on erosive lands may not be able to absorb the
conservation costs, thus foregoing this credit source and conceivably the
opportunity to enter or remain in farming. Although this illustration may
seem like an isolated case, careful analysis of other cross-compliance
possiniiiities produces similar results,
Iz an expanded role for governntent programs is deemed socially
desirable, an efficient approach would be to retire the least profitable.
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or marginal, cropland. SimulCaneously, these same cropland acres are
frequently the more erosive areas. Thus, if such a program was developed,
especially with a longer term retirement provision, supply could be
restrained enough to maintain commodity prices at levels attained by
conventional supply control or land set-aside programs. The cost of such a
conservation program could be considerably less than the PIK program.
Farmers in regions not susceptible to heavy erosion would gain through
reduced national grain supplies and higher commodity prices. However, since
those regions of highly erodable soils would switch to less intensive
farming and would not gain through higher market prices for grain and
cotton, they would need compensation by the public to offset their income
reduction.
Water conservation efforts suffer from many of the same problems
plaguing soil conservation efforts. The proposed longer term land
retirement scheme may reduce the rate of depeletion of aquifers and reduce
the need to pump irrigation waters.
Greater Reliance on Market
Market equilibrium prices determined in the absence of government
intervention may be expected to have a positive long term impact on soil and
water conservation. The excess supply problems would be solved by the
movement of excess resources out of agriculture, a reduction in cropland
tilled, and a decrease in the erosion level. More importantly, the more
erosive cropland may revert to pasture or be abandoned for crop production
purposes. Current efforts to ensure a "fair" price for agricultural
commoditLes have made it profitable to bring such lands under crop
production.
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A negative impact o£ the more market oriented approach is greater
anticipated fluctuations in commodity prices and net returns. Such
uncertainty may discourage needed investment in soil conserving practices.
Yet, if we observe the wide fluctuations in commodity prices under current
farm programs, it is unlikely to show more eratic fluctuations.
Grasslands, especially in the Great Plains region, have been converted
to irrigated cropland under current farm programs. If market prices are
lower under a free market approach, some of thee irrigated lands will revert
to pasture. Such adjustments may reduce irrigation water demands and
depletion of water supplies.
Energy in Agriculture
Agriculture is both a user and a producer of energy. The potential of
agriculture in both capacities is closely tied to the farm policies adopted.
Reductions in cropland cultivated either through supply control programs or
expansion of market forces will reduce energy demands in crop production.
Possibly the latter alternative will cause greater reductions in energy use
because it is not accompanied by price support activities, which will
generally increase the derived demand for energy.
Although temporarily in a period of liquid fuel price decline, as
prices again resume their upward trend, energy saving technologies and
substitution of both inputs and outputs will occur, "For example, much of
the shift to conservation tillage and improved irrigation efficiencies has
been induced by rising energy prices. As long as sharp curtailments are not
encountered, agriculture should respond to rising energy prices without
major disruptions.
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Finally, agriculture has potential as a producer of liquid energy or
the feedstock for such production. Research with on—farm energy production
(e.g., methane, alcohol, biogas) has not demonstrated economic feasibility,
given the scale of operation. Amore significant market has developed for
corn as a feedstock in commercial alcohol fuel production. Yet, this
potential is highly sensitive to added governn^nt involvement (through tax
subsidies, capital investment subsidies, and research support), to the
relative price of gasoline, and to the cost of capital financing. On a
competitive market basis, only limited opportunities have evolved.
Using corn and other commodities for fuel production has also been
proposed to handle supplies produced by excess capacity in the agricultural
sector. Such an approach would encounter problems with feedstock supply
stability and with reduced international demand due to higher domestic
prices. Generally, it njust be conceded that the welfare costs of such an
approach are high although domestic energy security may be enhanced.
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Summary
The downward swing in the business cycle and tight money and other
macro economic policies in this country and around the world plus uncoBuoonly
> good growing conditions are largely responsible for U.S. agriculture being
in an excess capacity situation. We should not dismantle our agricultural
production capacity. We need a safety net of agricultural policy. But the
supply control in 1982 was too small and that in 1983 too large. The
Farmer-Owned Reserve (FOR) assisted farmers to store more grain in 1983 than
was needed to clear the market at loan rates. FOR overshot the nark this
spring. The April-May price of grain to feeders said "save" when the stock
reports said-"feed." The 1983 supply control idled nearly 20% of our acre
age. More control in '82 and less in '83 would have been less damaging for
agri business and the livestock industry.
The 1984 loan rates set in 1981 should be revised downward. Livestock
feeders have been subjected to wild gyrations in feed grain prices from
$3.50 in summer 1981, then below $2.00 in fall of '82, now over $3.00 spring
of '83 and probably back down below $2.50 after October 1983.
Ic seems Federal budget austerity for domestic programs prevented
adequate land diversion and supply control in '82, Saving troney on land
retirement in 1982 was shortsighted. The result was 1982 production
.'xceeded demand and a large volume of money was needed for FOR. It seems
hadget financing of FOR and PIK allowed these programs to be large
while tr.e "on budget," but relatively efficient, land diversion for '82 was
-j-iLtinaced. Per dollar of farm income transferred, FOR and PIK are imre
expensive than paid land diversion and thus ultimately are politically
c.&'£<iging to financing future agricultural policy.
^ i
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U.S. agriculture's large capacity is a national asset. Taxpayers,
fartrers and agri business have built it painstakingly over the years by
investment. We need Co keep our system of farmers, land, water, agri-
bi-.siness, research and education, railroads, credit, and so on in place.
The purpose of the safety net of Agricultural Policy is to inaintaj.n U.S.
agri capacity ready to function when demand re-expands. Agricultural policy
needs to be flexible and ready to stabilize in time. Let's have xnore far-
sighted agricultural policy, more efficient and appropriate to laeet the
needs of our modern commercialized agriculture v^ich operates in a manner
that is very exposed and vulnerable to world business cycles and macro
policy.
